We show that a market for emission permits has an important characteristic not previously noted, a characteristic that has significant economic and political implications. When the level of emissions affects utilities, there is an unexpected link between equity and efficiency: The initial distribution of property rights or emission permits determines whether a competitive global CO 2 permit market will operate efficiently. 3 Prior to now it has been generally assumed that the manner in which emission permits are initially distributed will not affect the efficiency of the market. 4 We show here that of all the many possible ways of distributing a given total of emission rights, very few are compatible with efficient markets. In this case equity and efficiency are not orthogonal, as in the first and second theorems of welfare economics for standard competitive markets. How does this happen?
The key to this result is the fact that the atmospheric concentration of CO 2 is a privately produced public good, privately produced but affecting the utility levels of all people. The reason is that CO 2 mixes thoroughly in the atmosphere, leading to a uniform concentration over the globe. Therefore, we have a global public good. People or regions cannot choose their concentration levels independently. However, the concentration is determined by every individual who runs a car or a heating furnace and by every firm operating transportation or burning fuel in any other way. 5 Therefore, we have a privately produced public good. The fact that CO 2 concentration is a privately produced public good affecting the welfare levels of individuals leads to the equity-efficiency interaction. As noted, everyone has de facto to consume the same CO 2 concentration. For efficiency this common level must be what they demand, given prices and their incomes. In summary, for agents to demand freely the same amounts of CO 2 at an equilibrium requires a particular choice of the distribution of income.
Similar points were made in Chichilnisky [2] and Chichilnisky and Heal [4] , 6 where this simple observation was shown to have other far-reaching consequences. In particular these papers establish that the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries is neither sufficient nor necessary for Pareto efficiency: Pareto-efficient allocations may have different marginal costs. Here we show that this line of argument, when developed further, implies that efficiency and distribution cannot be separated in environmental markets. Efficiency requires an appropriate distribution of property rights. The fact that many distributions of property rights lead to inefficient outcomes allows us to construct an example of a two-region world in which a transfer of property rights from the North to the South, accompanied by a decrease in the total of emission permits, leaves both regions better off.
Finally, we investigate the extent to which an equilibrium concept related to that of Lindahl is the appropriate concept in permit markets. There is a simple reason that this might be so: A Lindahl equilibrium is the only market equilibrium known to lead to Pareto efficiency with public goods. 7 As a permit market is a market that determines the production of public goods, we might therefore expect that efficiency would require the key feature of a Lindahl equilibrium, namely, a multiplicity of prices, in fact one price per pair of traders. In a Lindahl equilibrium each producer of a public good is paid for her production by each consumer, and the per unit payment typically varies from consumer to consumer. Therefore, relative to the framework of a Lindahl equilibrium, a permit market as formalized here is an ''incomplete market'' because everyone pays the same price for the permits. This can be interpreted as assuming that the ''individualized'' markets between buyers and sellers are missing. Our main result shows that, in a certain sense, it is possible to compensate for the absence of individualized markets by reallocating property rights in tradable permits. 8 
Efficiency and International Emissions
Following the model set out in Chichilnisky [2] and developed further in Chichilnisky and Heal [4] , we consider a world economy with I regions, I Ն 2, indexed by i ϭ 1, ..., I. Each region has a utility function u i , which depends on its consumption of a vector of private goods c i ϭ (c i,1 , c i,2 , ..., c i, M ), where M is the number of private goods (indexed by m), and also on the quality of the world's atmosphere, a, which is a public good. 9 The quality of the atmosphere a can be thought of as a measure of abatement. It could be measured by, for example, the reciprocal or the negative of the concentration of CO 2 : The more abatement there is, the lower is this concentration. [14] . 8 The dimensionality of the space of permit allocations equals that of the space of Lindahl prices needed to complete the market, so that the two approaches are mathematically equivalent. 9 Formally, u i (c i , a) measures welfare, where u i : is a continuous, strictly concave and
Mϩ1
ᑬ → ᑬ increasing function. It is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable.
is ''produced'' by emissions of carbon, which are positively associated with the levels of production of private goods. Let y i be a vector (y i, m ) in R M giving the production levels of the M private goods in country i. Then I a ϭ a , a ϭ F ( y ) for each country i ϭ 1, ..., I, and
The production functions or abatement functions F i are continuously differentiable and strictly concave and show the trade-off between the level of abatement or quality of the atmosphere and the output of consumption. 10 An allocation of consumption and abatement across all countries is a vector efficient if there is no other feasible allocation at which every region's utility is at least as high, and one's utility is strictly higher. 12 It is immediate therefore that a Pareto-efficient allocation solves the following problem:
Here N k is a utility level specified for region k. 13 To solve problem (3.4) we can write out the corresponding Lagrangian
where a has been replaced by ͚ i F i ( y i ) in view of (3.1). Differentiating L with respect to the components of c i and y i and equating to zero gives the first-order conditions for efficiency (3.5) and (3.6):
equal marginal valuations of consumption
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where i is the designated region whose utility is being maximized, l k is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint that region k should reach a specified welfare level, and
Each of these systems of equations has a simple interpretation. The first system, (3.5), requires that for any good m the marginal social value of consumption be the same for all regions i. We refer here to the ''marginal social value of consumption by region i'' because the marginal utilities of consumption are weighted by the terms l k , which represent the shadow price or social value of utility in region k. The second set of equations, (3.6), is a slight modification of the conventional Lindahl-Bowen condition, popularized by Samuelson. It requires that the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and a private good be equal to the sum of the marginal rates of substitution. (See also chapter 13 for a detailed analysis of efficiency conditions.)
Without Lump-Sum Transfers
If we restrict international lump-sum redistributions, the corresponding characterization of (constrained) Pareto efficiency is different. For example, if we model an autarchic world where in each region consumption is required to equal production, the second line of the problem (3.4) is dropped and the vector y i in the third line replaced by c i . In this case the necessary conditions for Pareto efficiency are just (3.6). Condition (3.5) is no longer required.
Should Marginal Costs Be Equal?
Note that the marginal cost of abatement in region i in terms of good m is just the reciprocal of the marginal productivity with respect to m of the function F i : It follows that with lump-sum transfers, as represented by constraint (3.2), marginal costs will always be equalized, as private goods can always be shifted between countries by lump-sum redistributions to equate their marginal valuations. However, if each country is required to consume what it produces or is required to trade internationally subject to a standard balance of trade constraint, this is not true. 15 Therefore, in general equalization of marginal costs across countries is not necessary for efficiency.
International Emission Markets
In section 3.2 we characterized in equations (3.5) and (3.6) allocations that are Pareto efficient in an institution-free framework as well as those in which each region consumes what it produces.
Next we introduce an institutional framework: an international market for tradable permits. The aim is to investigate the first-best efficiency of the equilibria in this market. To model a policy-relevant situation, assume that the initial distribution of emission permits is the only variable used to address distributional issues. 16 Each region is given an initial endowment of permits to emit E i units of CO 2 , where ͚ i E i ϭ E*, the desired level of total emissions. Regions trade these and behave as price takers in a market in which there is a single price p e for a permit to emit one unit.
If the number of units of CO 2 emitted exceeds the number of permits a region has, the region must buy the difference in the permit market. Otherwise, it can sell excess permits and use the proceeds to buy private goods at prices p l . A region therefore maximizes its utility u i (c i , a) subject to the following budget constraint:
52 • Chichilnisky, Heal, and Starrett 14 Chichilnisky and Heal [4] established the following proposition in the case of one private good. The extension to the present case, which differs only in having many private goods is immediate. 15 See Chichilnisky and Heal [5] . 16 In particular, unrestricted lump-sum redistributions of private goods are not possible. is zero. 17 The budget constraint requires that in each region the value of consumption equal the value of production plus the net revenue from the sale of permits. This can be rewritten as
The left-hand side is the difference between the value of domestic consumption and production, that is, the balance of trade. A surplus of consumption over production 18 is funded by the revenue generated by sales of permits in international markets. Conversely, a net purchase of permits in international markets has to be matched by a surplus of production over consumption and therefore a net export position.
A comparison of the balance-of-trade condition (3.9) with the actual budget constraint (3.3) suggests that controlling the initial endowments of emission rights can act as a substitute for lump-sum transfers. This point is developed later in section 3.4.
Each region seeks to maximize its utility u i (c i , a) subject to the budget constraint (3.8) and to the production relations given in (3.1). We assume that in so doing it supposes the total level of emissions to be fixed at E*, the desired total level. This in effect implies the existence of a credible intergovernment agency (the UNFCC, for example) that sets and implements global emission targets. 19 
Market
Behavior -Maximizing its welfare subject to the budget constraint (3.9), each region chooses consumption levels and abatement or emission levels to satisfy the following first-order conditions: That is, a position of net imports. 19 An alternative, which we do not explore here, would be to look for a Nash equilibrium in countries' abatement levels. In this Nash case each country would observe the emissions of each other and then choose its optimal emission level on the assumption that these levels are fixed. This approach is developed in Heal and Lin [18] These are standard conditions for utility maximization subject to production and budget constraints. First-order condition (3.10) just requires that marginal rates of substitution between goods be equated to their price ratios, and (3.11) requires tangency between the production possibility frontier and an isoprofit hyperplane.
Market Solutions that Are Not Pareto
Optimal -How do first-order conditions (3.10) and (3.11) characterizing a region's optimal market choice compare with conditions (3.5) and (3.6), which describe Pareto-efficient allocations? Condition (3.11) from regional utility maximization is the same as the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition (3.6) for the efficient provision of public goods, provided that
Condition (3.12) can hold only if the marginal valuations of the mth private good, and are independent of i and k, that is, are the ‫ץ‬u /c l (‫ץ‬u /‫ץ‬c ),
same for all regions. Condition (3.5) is required for Pareto efficiency-equalization of the marginal valuation of consumption across countries-and automatically implies this. However, there is nothing equivalent to (3.5) in the solutions to the regions' optimization problems. The only other condition from each regions' own optimization problems is (3.10), which does not imply equality of marginal valuations across countries.
In brief, utility maximization subject to the budget constraint (3. This condition would of course be satisfied if there l (‫ץ‬u /‫ץ‬c ) ᭙m, ᭙k ϭ / i.
were policy instruments available to redistribute freely all resources without restriction across regions-if, for example, lump-sum redistributions were possible. In the absence of such instruments, what is required to ensure that (3.5) is met and efficiency attained in the permit market?
Equity and Efficiency in Permit Markets
Competitive permit markets do not generally lead to the conditions for Pareto efficiency because there is nothing that ensures that condition (3.5),
.., M and is satisfied. Now this is clearly a ᭙k ϭ / i, condition on the distribution of income or wealth. Look in more detail at the determinants of the terms ‫ץ‬u i /‫ץ‬c i, m . As u i ϭ u i (c i , E*), where E* is fixed, the derivatives of u i with respect to consumption can depend only on consumption levels. 20 In the absence of policy instruments to achieve unrestricted redistributions across regions, the only variables then available for ensuring that marginal social valuations of consumption are equalized are the initial allocations of permits, and therefore only those initial permit allocations that ensure that (3.5) is satisfied will lead to Pareto-efficient allocations. We formalize this in the following and show that very few initial allocations satisfy this condition.
Why Distribution
Matters -An intuitive explanation for the dependence of efficiency on distribution is as follows. Because we are trading a public good, everyone must consume the same amount at equilibrium, a physical requirement resulting from the fact that the gas CO 2 distributes uniformly across the world. Achieving more targets typically requires more instruments, and here the extra instruments are the distribution of emission permits or property rights. The efficient distributions of property rights are those at which there are market-clearing prices such that all regions demand freely the same level of the public good. If regions' preferences were similar, this would require similar income levels. A useful comparison is with a Lindahl equilibrium, the standard market equilibrium concept for public goods, in which the extra instruments are provided by region-specific prices. Recall that at a Lindahl equilibrium the prices for public goods will typically be different for different consumers, so that with Lindahl markets different regions would pay different prices for emission permits. In this case permit trading would not equalize marginal abatement costs across regions.
Another explanation for the significance of the distribution of property rights is as follows:
1. Trading emission permits naturally leads to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries. By obvious arguments each country equates the marginal cost of abatement to the price of an emission permit, which by assumption is the same for all countries (see equation [3.11] ).
2. Equalization of marginal costs is efficient only if marginal social valuations of consumption are equalized (see proposition 1). Therefore, permit trading is efficient only if marginal social valuations of consumption are equalized. This can be achieved only by an appropriate redistribution of wealth.
3. The assignment of property rights brings about a redistribution of wealth. The efficient allocations of permits are those that equate marginal valuations of consumption.
An Example: One Private Good and Two
Regions -Imagine two regions trading one private good and one public good (abatement). Figure 3 .1 shows the abatement-production frontier and the preferences over combinations of public and private goods for each region. An emission level E* has been chosen that we assume is a level associated with a Pareto-efficient allocation. Therefore, the question before us is, When can we attain this efficient allocation of resources by trading emission permits?
The total abatement level of the two regions must be ϪE*, and because they are identical, each must produce a level of abatement of ϪE*/2. Each region's production of the private good is now determined to be the level that corresponds to an abatement level of ϪE*/2, so that the production points of the regions are now determined as in figure 3.1. As a result, the relative price of the public and private good is determined and is the slope of the frontier at this point. Each region's consumption of the public good abatement is the total amount of abatement produced, A* ϭ ϪE*, and its consumption of the private good is determined by maximizing utility subject to the equation
where c i and y i are region i's consumption and production of the single private good and p e is the relative price of the emission permits. Here y i , p e , and a i are fully determined from the total level of emissions E* by the following chain.
Total emissions E* imply individual emissions E*/2, which imply abatement levels, which imply production levels and the price of permits relative to the consumption good. Therefore, only E i , the initial endowment of permits, is available to control consumption c i . This variable must therefore be used to ensure that marginal valuations of the private good satisfy the condition (3.5) needed for Pareto efficiency. Figure 3 .1 illustrates how this can be done. If both regions are given endowments of permits equal to their levels of emission, neither will trade permits, and each will consume the amount of the private good that it produces. They will consume levels of the private good given by the horizontal coordinate of the production point in figure 3 .1, y*. Their consumption of the public good abatement will be the sum of the production levels of both regions, A*. Each region's consumption vector has a vertical coordinate equal to A* and a horizontal coordinate equal to its consumption of the private good, namely (y*, A*). 21 Consider further the case in which both regions have an initial allocation of permits equal to their production of CO 2 . As they both neither import nor export the private good and so consume and produce the same amounts and also single private good. Then to satisfy (3.5) region 2's consumption of the private good has to be decreased and region 1's increased from their common production level. This can be achieved by giving region 1 an endowment of permits (b) in excess of its emissions and region 2 an endowment (bЈ) less than its emissions. Region 1 then increases its consumption of the private good by selling its spare permits and using the proceeds to buy the private good, whereas region 2 is forced to sell the private good to buy permits. Region 1's marginal utility of the private good will be less than region 2's, and the ratio will decrease continuously from unity as region 1's initial endowment of permits is raised above the emission level corresponding to its production of the private good (and region 2's is correspondingly reduced). Consider the straight line p e through the regions' production points tangent to the production frontier, as shown in figure 3.1. Each region produces a mix of abatement and private good given by the point of tangency and then trades private goods for emission permits along the line tangent to the production frontier. If it has more permits than needed (i.e., more than E*/2), it will add consumption of the private good by selling permits and buying the private good along the tangency line, whose slope is the relative price of permits and the private good. As it moves along this line, its consumption of abatement remains constant. 22 However, its consumption of the private good changes. The other region will be symmetrically placed on this line relative to the production point ( y*, A*). In this way we can reach an allocation at which all markets will clear, total emissions will be E*, and condition (3.5) needed for efficiency will be satisfied. We can do this by picking the permit allocations and therefore consumption levels of the private good correctly. As the ratio of the regions' marginal utilities changes continuously with their initial allocations of permits, there will generally be at most a finite number of initial allocations at which the efficiency conditions hold. In this simple example, there will be just one initial distribution of permits that will lead to efficiency. This argument illustrates the following result.
Equity and Efficiency in Environmental Markets
Proposition 2 Let E* be the level of total emissions at a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources in the economy described in section 2 with one private good and two regions. Then of all possible ways of allocating the total emission E* among the regions as initial endowments, only a subset of measure zero will lead to market equilibria that are Pareto efficient. Alternatively, almost every allocation of permits between regions will lead to inefficient outcomes.
For a proof, see the Appendix. 23 The diagrammatic analysis illustrating proposition 2 can in fact be pushed further, as in figure 3.2. As figure 3.1 shows, each possible distribution of the total emission permits E* between the two regions leads them to a pair of levels of consumption of the private good given by the horizontal coordinates of pairs of points, such as (a, aЈ) or (b, bЈ), which are symmetrically placed on the line that is tangent to the production frontier at the production point. These pairs of points in turn give rise to consumption vectors for the public and private and private goods, together represented by points such as bЉ and b* in figure 3.1. From figure 3.1 we can ascertain the utility levels of these points. Suppose that we plot the utility levels arising from all such possible distributions of the total E* permits. What does this set of points look like?
We know that few points will be Pareto efficient, so that this must form a curve largely inside the utility possibility frontier, touching this frontier at a finite number of points, at most. In fact in the present two-region fully symmetric case, it is easy to see that once we have an allocation of permits that satisfies (3.5), departures from this allocation increase the difference from equality of the two sides in (3.5), so that the efficient allocation is unique. Figure 3 .2 therefore illustrates the set of utility vectors associated with different allocations of the total of E* permits and also shows the overall utility possibility frontier. Each point on the frontier corresponds to a different total emission level and therefore to a different total number of permits, and for each point on the frontier there is one way of allocating the corresponding total of permits that is efficient and gives the utility vector on the utility possibility frontier. 24 
Pareto-Improving Reallocations from North to South: Win-Win
Solutions -A consequence of proposition 2 is that in general a competitive market in emission permits admits changes in the total and the distribution of permits that are Pareto improving, something that is of course not possible in competitive markets for private goods. Figure 3 .3 illustrates such a situation.
This figure refers to two regions, called, for obvious reasons, North and South. Both are identical in production possibilities and preferences. The production frontier and two indifference curves are shown. We consider a decrease in the total number of emission permits (an increase in abatement) coupled with a transfer of permits from the North to the South and show that this can be Pareto improving for both regions simultaneously.
The initial abatement level is given by the vertical coordinate of the lower of the two solid horizontal lines and the final by that of the higher. The initial production point is therefore determined so that abatement by each region is half the initial total. Relative prices of permits and the private good are given by the slope of the production frontier at this point, and the initial permit distribution is such that the initial abatement levels of the North and South are as shown. This leads to consumption levels for the North and the South on the higher and the lower indifference curve, respectively. Now consider a different and lower total of emission permits, one corre-sponding to the higher final abatement level. Each region has to produce less of the private good and abate more, as shown by the point ''final production.'' At the same time as the total abatement target is raised, the South's abatement target is lowered (from ''South initial'' to ''South final''), and the North's is raised. In other words permits are transferred from North to South while the total is reduced. The new equilibrium consumption levels are as shown. Both regions are now better off, and the level of world emissions is lower.
The General Case -
The result in proposition 2 holds for the general case, but the argument is less intuitive. Formally, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Let E* be the level of total emissions at a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources in the economy described in section 2. Assume that regions maximize utility subject to the budget constraint (3.8) given by the ability to trade emission permits. Assume furthermore that a regularity condi- tion defined in the Appendix is satisfied. Then of all possible ways of allocating the total emission E* among the regions as initial endowments, only a subset of measure zero will lead to market equilibria that are Pareto efficient. Alternatively, almost every allocation of permits between regions will lead to inefficient outcomes. If the inequality (I Ϫ 1) ϩ m Յ (I Ϫ 1) ϫ m holds, then only a finite number of ways of allocating the emission rights lead to efficiency.
The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix. Strict concavity and the regularity assumption are needed for this result. Otherwise, one can construct counterexamples. For example, with quasi-linear preferences of the form u i (a) ϩ a i c i , a i Ͼ 0, there might be infinitely many allocations of permits that will lead to efficient outcomes. Although the dependence of efficiency on distribution runs quite counter to the thrust of the first and second welfare theorems, there are parallels in the literature. For example, in economies with increasing returns to scale, there are some allocations of a given total of initial endowments that are compatible with attainment of efficiency at a marginal cost-pricing equilibrium and some that are not (see Brown and Heal [1] ). The orthogonality of efficiency and distribution might therefore be limited to ''classical'' economic environments free from increasing returns and public goods or externalities. In fact, there is a perspective from which increasing returns and public goods are closely related, so that this connection is not surprising.
Lindahl Permit Markets
In this section we compare the permits markets modeled previously in which there is a uniform price for all buyers and sellers, with a Lindahl-type framework in which each region may pay a different price for emission permits. This is motivated by reference to a Lindahl equilibrium, at which each producer of a public good is paid by every consumer for each unit produced, and in principle all consumers may pay different prices to a given producer. 25 In the present context the exact analog would be the following. Any region considering producing one more unit of emissions would have to purchase from every other the right to emit that extra unit. It would therefore have to buy an emission permit from each affected region, with possibly a different price ruling in each bilateral trade. This would give as many prices as there are in a Lindahl equilibrium.
Because the permit price p k,e is region specific, this condition can now be satisfied without l k (‫ץ‬u k /‫ץ‬c k, l ) being the same for all k. In other words this condition for Pareto efficiency can be satisfied now without an optimal distribution of income or wealth, which equates marginal valuations of consumption. Therefore, if redistribution of private goods or emission permits is ruled out, there is a real efficiency gain to having permit prices that are region specific, for without them it would not be possible to attain a Pareto-efficient allocation.
What are the independent arguments of the functions in (3.16)? Note that once the prices of all goods are chosen, the production levels of private goods and of abatement are determined by equation (3.11) , giving first-order conditions in production. And these levels, together with prices and endowments of permits, determine consumption levels through the budget constraint (3.8) and the first-order conditions on consumption (3.10). Therefore, the arguments of (3.16) can be taken to be E i , i ϭ 1, ..., I and p l , l ϭ 1, . .., m and e. Now, as the E i are nonnegative and sum to a fixed number, they form a space of dimension (I Ϫ 1). As there are only m relative prices, the left hand side of system (3.16) is a function, call it V, defined on
In fact it is de- Regularity condition. The matrix of first partial derivatives of the function V has full rank.
Note that V is defined on a compact set in (IϪ1)ϩm ᑬ . We now distinguish two cases: (1) (I Ϫ 1) ϩ m Յ (I Ϫ 1) ϫ m and (2) (I Ϫ 1) ϩ m Ͼ (I Ϫ 1) ϫ m. In case 1 the dimension of the domain of V is less than or equal to that of the range, the regularity condition implies that the matrix of first partial derivatives is 1 to 1, and the compactness of the domain implies that the number of zeros of V is finite.
In case 2 the dimension of the domain exceeds that of the range. By basic transversality theory, the dimension of a preimage of zero is a manifold of codimension (I Ϫ 1) ϩ m Ϫ (I Ϫ 1) ϫ m Ͼ 0 and is therefore a set of measure zero.
Note that an efficient equilibrium will be in the intersection of the graph of p ϭ p(E) with the zeros of V. In the case of two regions, there is a simple proof that this intersection is nonempty.
